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Comparative Originalism
David Fontana*
I.

Introduction

American constitutional scholarship can sometimes seem enormously
repetitive. Even if there are truly new ideas or truly new perspectives, they
seem to be answering the same old questions.
We have popular
constitutionalism, which seems to be both an old idea and an answer to the
old questions posed by our “obsession” with the role of unelected judges in a
democratic society.1 The paradigmatic scholarly event in the law in any
given academic year is still probably the publication of the Supreme Court
Foreword by the Harvard Law Review.2 The more things change, the more
they stay the same.
In this crowded scholarly world, Jamal Greene’s work in his short
career so far stands out. He has been writing about another overanalyzed
topic in constitutional law, originalism, but has been offering some fresh new
perspectives. Professor Greene’s earlier work focused on the national
politics surrounding originalism.3 More recently, along with several
collaborators, he has written about the individual politics and public opinion
data surrounding originalism.4 To these new perspectives on originalism we
* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. My thanks go to
Jamal Greene and the editors of the Texas Law Review for inviting me to write this Response, and
to Brad Snyder and Peter Smith for their comments on this Response.
1. See generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002).
2. See Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social and
Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 463 (1994–1995) (“Since 1951 the editors of the
Harvard Law Review have selected a prominent scholar of constitutional law to write a ‘Foreword’
to the Review’s annual survey of the work of the Supreme Court.”).
3. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009).
4. See Jamal Greene et al., Profiling Originalism, (Columbia Pub. Law Research Paper No. 10232), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1567702.
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have the article I will respond to here, which begins the conversation about
originalism from a comparative perspective.5 Professor Greene argues that
originalism is distinctively an American obsession, and offers some initial
explanations as to why that is the case.
Richard Primus has helpfully responded to the article from a domestic
constitutional theory perspective.6 I will address the article from a
comparative constitutional law perspective. From this perspective, I consider
Professor Greene’s work very promising, but also as posing some concerns
addressed very briefly in this Response. First, the article needs to be clearer
about whose attitudes towards originalism it is comparing: courts,
commentators, or countries? Are we discussing just the United States
Supreme Court versus other high courts? Are we discussing elite political
and social actors in the United States compared to other countries? Are we
comparing academics in the United States and other countries? As I will
briefly mention, the differences in attitudes towards originalism might be
more or less dramatic depending on whose attitudes we are comparing, and
depending on whose attitudes we are comparing we might need different
types of evidence than the types Professor Greene provides.
Second, Professor Greene might be comparing the wrong countries.
Professor Greene compares originalism in the United States to originalism in
Canada and Australia, because of what he considers to be the relevant and
important similarities between the constitutional systems of these three
countries.7 In an ongoing project, though, I argue that the most relevant
dimensions of a country that explains its orientation towards originalism is
whether or not its constitution created the nation that lives under the
constitution, or whether the constitution merely reorganized the institutions
of the country but did not create the nation that lives under the constitution.
In other words, was the constitution revolutionary, or reorganizational? The
American Constitution was perhaps the first nation-creating, revolutionary
constitution, and so has always featured an element of originalism. The other
countries that Professor Greene examines—Canada and Australia—feature

5. See Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (2009) (considering
why originalism is a major topic of discussion in the United States and less so at least in some other
countries).
6. See Richard Primus, The Functions of Ethical Originalism, 88 TEXAS L. REV. SEE ALSO 79
(2010) (examining some of the forms of ethical arguments that Professor Greene highlights in his
Article).
7. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 5, at 1 (“This Article . . . focus[es] particular attention on the
political and constitutional histories of Canada and Australia, nations that, like the United States,
have well-established traditions of judicial enforcement of a written constitution, and that share with
the United States a common law adjudicative norm.”); id. at 4–5 (“Like the United States, Canada
and Australia are stable, liberal, federal democracies with independent judiciaries, well-established
traditions of judicial review, and written constitutions of long standing relative to most of the
world’s. Moreover, all three countries have common law legal regimes derived from British
practice and so seem more likely than civil law countries to approach constitutional interpretation
using the evolutionary and judge-empowering methods generally disfavored by originalists.”).
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“constitutions” (the foundational documents in both of these countries are
usually called something other than simply “the Constitution” in the first
place) that simply reorganized existing communities rather than created those
communities. For the purposes of comparing modalities of constitutional
interpretation, then, Professor Greene is not really comparing
“the most similar” countries, but instead the most polar opposite countries.8
II.

What Are We Comparing?

In order to assess the accuracy of the comparisons highlighted in his
article, it must first be clear what Professor Greene intends to compare.
Professor Greene seems to compare the discussions regarding constitutional
interpretation in entire countries9—that is, he wants to compare the decisions
of courts, the writing of leading academics, and the discussions by leading
social and political commentators.
But to compare systematic and
comprehensive institutions, we need systematic and comprehensive evidence,
and the article is largely lacking on that front (particularly outside of the
United States). I admire Professor Greene for the enormity of the
comparison in constitutional interpretation that he purports to undertake.
Comparative constitutional law, because of the importance of context and
detail, might be a field like legal history in that scholarly projects are better
suited as scholarly books rather than as law review articles. But if these
overall country comparisons are going to be done as law review articles, as
Professor Greene tries to do, then the evidence presented must be systematic.
Consider, for instance, a comparison of originalism in the United States
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the High Court of
Australia. I would argue that the interpretive differences between these
courts in terms of how these courts actually use originalism to decide cases
are overall much smaller than Professor Greene suggests. Professor Greene
states that our Supreme Court is more originalist than other courts.10 But is
this really true? There are certainly examples of major American Supreme
Court opinions that talk about originalism, most recently and notably District
of Columbia v. Heller.11 There are also examples of major Supreme Court
opinions that do not make any substantial references to originalist evidence,
like the University of Michigan affirmative action cases in 2003,12 cases
about the Fourteenth Amendment that never seriously engage with the Civil
8. Id. at 4 n.11 (stating that the Article tries to compare the “most similar cases”).
9. See, e.g., id. at 1 (“[O]riginalism is remarkably unpopular outside the United States.”).
10. See id. at 4. (observing that “few peoples more earnestly or enthusiastically engage
originalist constitutional premises than we do”).
11. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2796 (2008) (discussing, inter alia, the original draft of the Second
Amendment). See Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122
HARV. L. REV. 246, 256–57 (2008) (noting that the majority and dissenting opinions rely much on
originalist evidence).
12. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(neither making thorough originalist arguments in the majority opinions).

192

Texas Law Review See Also

[Vol. 88:189

War or the leading creators of the Civil War Amendment like John Bingham.
In Canada, originalism factors into constitutional decisions at least in part
and at least some of the time,13 and Professor Greene himself notes that
originalism has had at least some supporters on the High Court of Australia.14
The record, then, is more mixed than the article suggests. Some of the
time the American Supreme Court relies on originalism, sometimes it does
not. Some of the time the Canadian Supreme Court and Australian High
Court discuss originalist evidence, sometimes they do not. Since this is not a
comparison of courts that always use originalism with courts that never do,
we need more systematic evidence, because Professor Greene does want to
show that in general our Supreme Court is more originalist than other courts.
Various forms of systematic evidence might suffice. Perhaps evidence that
in major constitutional cases the courts really differ; perhaps evidence about
in what percent of cases the United States Supreme Court cites The
Federalist Papers compared to similar references in the Canadian Supreme
Court and the Australian High Court. Regardless of what type of systematic
evidence is used, some of it must be systematic. To make general arguments
we need general evidence. Professor Greene’s conclusions are surely right
and quite interesting, but the evidence used must match these claims.
Professor Greene’s claims are probably more clearly true when it comes
to the prominence of originalism in the scholarly, political, and social
commentary of these countries. While it is easy to find originalism in the
scholarship of both politically conservative15 and politically liberal16
American academics, it is hard to find any examples of academics elsewhere
in the world discussing originalism as much as they do in the United States.
While it is easy to find originalism discussed by political actors17 or social
movements18 in the United States, it is hard to find originalism discussed by
13. See Re British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 507–09 (Can.)
(considering the minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and House of Commons as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of constitutional provisions).
14. See Greene, supra note 5, at 40–62 (describing “faint-hearted” support for originalist
arguments in Australian jurisprudence).
15. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent,
and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 676–77 (2006) (citing the Supreme Court’s originalist reasoning
with approval).
16. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291,
295–303 (2007) (explaining the relevance and importance of constitutional interpretation based on
originalist and original expected application arguments); Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism
and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 549–50 (2009) (proposing and praising the
compatibility of originalism and living constitutionalism); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and
Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 442–54 (2007) (emphasizing value of both
originalist interpretation and interpretation based on original expected application).
17. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 554 (2006) (“Since the 1980s, originalism has primarily
served as an ideology that inspires political mobilization and engagement. Its success and influence
is due chiefly to its uncanny capacity to facilitate passionate political participation.”).
18. See, e.g., Rush Limbaugh, Limbaugh Fundamentals: What is Originalism?, THE LIMBAUGH
LETTER, Dec. 2005, at 12, available at http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/menu/
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either group outside of the United States. But again, systematic evidence
would suffice. Are there really any articles in the leading law reviews of
Canada and Australia about originalism? Are there speeches on the floor of
their respective legislatures?
Do their religious leaders not discuss
originalism, as our religious leaders sometimes do? Again, all important
questions that must be considered if systematic arguments are to be made,
and none of these questions are really addressed in the article.
III. Selecting the Right Case Studies
My more substantial concern with Professor Greene’s rather important
article has to do with what countries he compares and why he compares these
particular countries, rather than what segments of each country he decides to
compare. Professor Greene focuses on three countries, but uses these
particular case studies to make some fairly general conclusions.19 To reach
the conclusions he wants to reach, though, Professor Greene selects precisely
the wrong countries to compare to the United States, rather than the right
countries.
Large-N studies—or studies of a range of countries rather than a
particularly important few—have become the trend in a wide range of
academic disciplines focused on comparison, as noted by the leading tracts
on comparative social science methodology.20 It is hard to do large-N studies
in comparative constitutional law, though, because there simply are not that
many countries that have stable, politically relevant constitutions and
constitutional courts.21
Moreover, because of linguistic and other

limfunoriginalism.guest.html (“Originalism means not molding the Constitution to fit your political
and social beliefs. It means not citing foreign law to support your preferences. It means not
imposing your personal policy whims on society via judicial fiat. And where the Constitution is
silent, it means not inventing a penumbra to support your own opinion.”).
19. See Greene, supra note 5, at 3 (“The notion that the meaning of a political constitution is, in
any practical sense, fixed at some point in the past and authoritative in present cases is pooh-poohed
by most leading jurists in Canada, South Africa, India, Israel, and throughout most of Europe.”); id.
(considering “[t]he global rejection of American-style originalism”); id. at 5–6 (“In short, although
some version of originalist judicial practice is not peculiar to the United States, the historicist
appeals that support American originalism have a potency here that is found in few foreign
constitutional courts, not the least the two most like our own.”); id. at 18 (“Outside the United
States, American originalism is as well-known as it is marginalized.”); id. at 62 (“Yet hardly any
sober or respectable foreign nation, our closest cousins included, boasts a similar mass of opinion in
favor of American-style originalism. Even in other democratic nations with long traditions of
constitutional judicial review, with deep common law roots, and with difficult processes of
constitutional amendment, resistance to judicial activism does not commingle with historical
fetishism.”).
20. See GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 67 (1994); RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED
STANDARDS xvii (Henry E. Brady & David Collier eds., 2004).
21. Tom Ginsburg and Zachary Elkins have produced a helpful database that provides more
general comparative constitutional law information, and have produced some large-N comparative
constitutional studies using this database. See generally ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG &
JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009).
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considerations, we do not have all of the relevant information about those
countries in the first place.
That means that comparative constitutional law has tended to focus on
the same smaller number of countries: Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the
United Kingdom, South Africa, France, Germany, and India. There are
exceptions,22 but the leading law review articles on comparative
constitutional law to this point focus primarily on these countries.23
Professor Greene is using a small-N approach, and looks to two of these
commonly examined countries, in his case Canada and Australia. Professor
Greene states very clearly that he is using a “most similar cases” approach to
comparative constitutional scholarship. By this, he means that he is
comparing the following:
[C]ases that have similar characteristics, or cases that are matched on
all variables or potential explanations that are not central to the study,
but vary in the values on the key independent and dependent variables.
By controlling for variables or potential explanations that are not
central to the study, the most similar cases principle helps “isolate” the
great significance of the variance on the key independent variable in
determining the variance on the dependent variable, thereby allowing
for partial substitute for statistical or experimental control. What is
more, because the most similar cases principle suggests that
comparable cases should be selected so as to hold constant non-key
variables while isolating the explanatory power of the key independent
variable, this approach is the most adequate for a diachronic, crosstime comparison within the same polity (e.g. a study of the impact of a
certain change through a pre change/post change comparison).24
The countries that Professor Greene considers to be “the most similar
cases” are the United States, Canada and Australia.25 He selects Canada and
Australia to compare to the United States because they are “two foreign legal
regimes that are in many key respects comparable to our own.”26
But comparable in what ways? Before comparing similar cases, we
need a convincing argument as to why these countries “are matched on all
variables or potential explanations that are not central to the study, but vary

22. E.g., GRETCHEN L. HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS AND
PRESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA (2005); TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER: LAW, POLITICS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT (2005); JEFFREY K. STATON,
JUDICIAL POWER AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN MEXICO (2010); MARY L. VOLCANSEK,
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN ITALY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (2000).
23. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1041, 1055–
56, 1061–62 (2004) (discussing primarily Canada and South Africa); Mark Tushnet, Weak-Form
Judicial Review and “Core” Civil Liberties, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2006) (relying
primarily on Canada and the United Kingdom).
24. Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J.
COMP. L. 125, 135 (2005).
25. Greene, supra note 5, at 4 n.11.
26. Id. at 4.
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in the values on the key independent and dependent variables.”27 In
Professor Greene’s article, though, we have a footnote saying that he is using
the “most similar cases” approach.28 In other places, as far as I can tell, there
are two other explicit statements about how these three countries are the
“most similar cases”: first, a statement that “This Article . . . . focus[es]
particular attention on the political and constitutional histories of Canada and
Australia, nations that, like the United States, have well-established traditions
of judicial enforcement of a written constitution, and that share with the
United States a common law adjudicative norm”29 and then a statement that
Like the United States, Canada and Australia are stable, liberal,
federal democracies with independent judiciaries, well-established
traditions of judicial review, and written constitutions of long standing
relative to most of the world’s. Moreover, all three countries have
common law legal regimes derived from British practice and so seem
more likely than civil law countries to approach constitutional
interpretation using the evolutionary and judge-empowering methods
generally disfavored by originalists.30
It is not clear whether these factors mean that Canada and Australia
are the most similar cases, and whether these factors are relevant here. First,
Canada and Australia do not have the most similar histories of “judicial
enforcement of a written constitution”31 as Professor Greene suggests.
Canada has only clearly judicially enforced a written constitution since the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982,32 meaning in fact it has one of the
least similar and shortest histories of judicial enforcement of a written
constitution. Australia still does not have a written constitution similar to the
American Constitution. It does have a constitution dating back some time,
and so Australian judicial review does operate like American judicial review
because Australian courts do have “‘general authority to determine what the
Constitution means’”33 and their “constitutional interpretations are
authoritative and binding.”34 Even putting aside that this broad power of
judicial review power in Australia is more recent and more controversial
there than here, Australia does not include an explicit bill of rights,35 which

27. Hirschl, supra note 23, at 134.
28. Greene, supra note5, at 4 n.11.
29. Id. at 1.
30. Id. at 4–5.
31. Id. at 1.
32. See Re British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 507 (Can.) (describing
the history of the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
33. See Kathleen E. Foley, Australian Judicial Review, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 281,
281 (2007) (quoting Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781,
2784 (2003)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 285.
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makes the Australian system an “outlier in modern constitutional systems,”36
particularly when compared to the American system.
Second, it is certainly true that Canada and Australia have a “common
law adjudicative norm”37 similar to the United States. But the “common
law” adjective more usually describes how torts or contracts works in a
country than it does how that country’s constitutional adjudication system
operates. The common law countries inspired by the British common law
tradition have, in fact, been the real outliers when it comes to constitutional
law, as they have been the last few to adopt written constitutions enforceable
by courts. Even then, they have only adopted something like what Stephen
Gardbaum has called the “Commonwealth model” of judicial review rather
than the “American model.”38 At the same time, civil law countries like
Germany have aggressive constitutional courts with broad interpretive
mandates,39 similar to the U.S. Supreme Court in the common law United
States.
In my preliminary studies of comparative originalism, as part of a
larger ongoing project, I have instead found that the “most similar cases” to
the United States when it comes to constitutional interpretation are those
countries where the constitution emerges from a revolution that creates the
nation, rather than a constitutional process that simply reorganized the
country and did not create the nation. I call this distinction, or really this
continuum, the difference between “revolutionary” constitutions and
“reorganizational” constitutions. Where a constitution is revolutionary, the
countries tend to be more focused on the founding moment and so tend to
focus more on what might be called an interpretive originalism. This is
because the founding moment and the role of the constitution in that moment
creates a series of national and cultural ideas and individuals that will be
relevant in the years to come.
For instance, the founders of the Constitution in a revolutionary
constitution are not just the founders of the Constitution, but also the
founders of the cultural nation. James Madison and George Washington
were instrumental in the creation of the American Constitution. But Madison
and Washington were also instrumental in the creation of the American
nation. So, we refer to those constitutional founders, and their constitutional
ideas have resonance in the years to come, because they were also the

36. Id.
37. Greene, supra note 5, at 1.
38. See Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 707, 707–08 (2001) (noting that the Commonwealth model of judicial review differs from
the American model because it does not grant fundamental rights higher legal status than
legislation, is not entrenched against ordinary repeal, and is not always enforced by courts setting
aside legislation).
39. See, e.g., Donald Kommers, The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political
System, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 470, 470 (describing the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany as
the “most active and powerful constitutional court in Europe”).
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founders for the entire nation. Their presence becomes a powerful
legitimating tool because they were “present at the creation”40 of the nation
as well as of the Constitution. The Constitution is simultaneous with the
creation moment, and the drafters of the Constitution tend to be taken from
the group of individuals who are also the creators of the nation. This means
the constitutional founders take on a certain status beyond just the words they
wrote into the Constitution. They become quasi-religious figures, bringing a
nation from isolation into a separate, juridical, autonomous existence.
Revolutionary constitutions, then, promote originalism because of the
particular reverence associated with the individual figures associated with the
creation of the Constitution—because they are also the individual figures
associated with the creation of the nation.
Likewise, the founders and the founding generation become
consequential because they are the first individuals and the first generation
with a series of ideas about constitutions and government and everything else
that are seen as legitimate. They are the first intellectuals, the first creators,
of the new cultural nation. Ideas from before the founding generation are
seen as either illegitimate, or less legitimate, because they were the ideas that
the nation broke from in order to create the constitution and the nation that
was in part created by the constitution. Not just Madison as an individual but
Madison’s generation has a certain resonance because that generation is the
first generation of Americans and so is the first generation with legitimated
ideas about the world.
If the nation predated the constitution, then several key cultural and
political understandings (what Paul Kahn has called the “interpretive
community” that defines a particular constitutional tradition)41 would predate
the constitution and significantly affect how the constitution was interpreted.
But if the constitution is created as the nation is created (and as part of the
creation of that nation), then the first series of legitimate ideas about the
social and political order are the ideas (and the individuals) that were also
behind the creation of the Constitution. In other words, just as the
individuals creating a constitution in revolutionary constitutions take on a
certain role, so do the ideas behind the constitution of that generation. They
are individuals and ideas that were the first to found the nation, not just the
constitution.
Given these realities, it should not be surprising that countries whose
courts and commentators make originalist arguments tend to come from
revolutionary constitutional traditions or are acting in revolutionary
constitutional moments; the post-colonial constitutions of African and Latin

40. DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT
(1969).
41. See Paul W. Kahn, Commentary, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1147 (1993) (discussing the “unique, historically identifiable qualities of
the . . . community” behind a constitution).
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America, for instance, foster many originalist arguments.42 Countries whose
courts and commentators do not make originalist arguments tend to have
constitutions that postdated the creation of the nation. This is not to say that
countries with revolutionary constitutions always focus on originalist
evidence and countries with reorganizational constitutions never do. Rather,
it is simply to say that the more revolutionary the constitutional tradition or
the moment, ceteris paribus, the greater the tendency there is to have
discussions of originalism.
Given these general arguments about the distinction between the
revolutionary versus reorganizational creation of constitutions, and how it
matters for later constitutional interpretation, Professor Greene’s case studies
appear to be completely opposite case studies rather than “the most similar
cases.” The American Constitution was revolutionary, not just because of
the speed with which it was created, as Professor Greene briefly
acknowledges,43 but because before the American Constitution there was no
United States of America. Books about the founding fathers sell well among
the general public not because Madison was simply the creator of the
Constitution, but because Madison and his generation were the creators of
the nation and the constitution. Their individual roles and fame, and the
prominence of their ideas, are because they were the first Americans. By
contrast, Pierre Trudeau, who was instrumental in the creation of
constitutional judicial review in Canada via the 1982 Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, was not the creator of the Canadian nation. Canada—and
Australia—“had functional constitutions by the start of the twentieth century
. . . and both countries were to varying degrees formally bound by the British
Crown well into the 1980s.”44 The constitution postdated some basic cultural
and political understandings in Canada and Australia, and so did the creators
of the Canadian Charter and the Australian Constitution. This is not just true
42. One interesting recent example of the invocation of originalist arguments from a court
interpreting a post-colonial constitution comes from a recent landmark decision by the Dehli High
Court in India striking down a law criminalizing adult consensual sodomy. See Naz Foundation v.
Government of the NCT, W.P. (C) No.7455/2001 of 2009 (Delhi HC); (2009) 160 DLT 277. The
Constitution of India, adopted in 1950 after India’s independence, functioned as the “cornerstone of
a nation.” GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION (1999).
In general, though, particularly compared to other post-colonial systems, “originalism [is] rarely
invoked by Indian courts.” Vikram Raghavan, Navigating the Noteworthy and Nebulous in Naz
Foundation, 2 N.U.J.S. L. REV. 297, 298 (2009). In deciding Naz—a particularly nation-defining
case—the Dehli High Court referred back to the ideas behind the creation of the Constitution of
India, discussing “where the notion of equality in the Indian Constitution flows from,” Naz
Foundation, supra, ¶ 129, as coming from the creation moment of the Constitution (and the creation
moment of the nation, since the court cites to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru). See Naz Foundation,
supra, ¶ 129. See also Sonia K. Katyal, The Dissident Citizen, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1464-67
(2000) (discussing the “Indian originalism” that the decision embodied).
43. See Greene, supra note 5, at 6 (“[O]ur Constitution is perceived as revolutionary rather than
evolutionary. The United States announced its sovereignty quickly, painfully, and without
sympathy to its former colonizers . . . . The sovereign ‘moments’ of Canada and Australia were
glacial by comparison.”).
44. Id.
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of Canada and Australia, but also of many of the other commonly studied
constitutions examined in current comparative constitutional law scholarship
(places like France and the United Kingdom, for instance). Perhaps this is
why much of the salience of originalism around the world has been missed to
this point.
IV. Conclusion
How many law review articles in the United States each year ask a
genuine new question, and provide genuinely new answers? Surely just a
handful, and Professor Greene’s article ranks among that handful. One could
search many American law reviews over hundreds of years, and many
foreign publications, and not find anyone asking the question “why is the
United States so interested in originalism”? Simply posing this question and
providing a theory as to its answer represents an enormous step forward in
our discussion about American constitutional interpretation.
My concern is, then, not with the fascinating question that Professor
Greene poses, nor with the interesting answer he provides but more with the
way he provides that answer. Being the first scholar to pose a question—let
alone the first to provide a substantial answer—is a dangerous task, because
going first means you are bound to slightly neglect some arguments that
might only be raised if many people were posing and answering the question.
Without the benefit of the scholarly echo chambers, things are much more
difficult. The gaps in Professor Greene’s article do not make me question
many of his analyses or explanations, but they mean that as discussion of this
topic proceeds further, there is still much to be written. And for that, we owe
Professor Greene a huge debt.

